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I. INTRODUCTION
A great privilege of being a state supreme court justice is the
opportunity to author an important water opinion. It could also be
one's last important opinion. Especially if the case involves a close,
split decision of your court and you are up for reelection in a
contested race.
In May of 2000, Justice Cathy Silak lost reelection to the Idaho
Supreme Court. In November of 1954, Chief Justice Mortimer Stone
lost reelection to the Colorado Supreme Court. The unifying element
of both defeats: each justice authored a decision with a one-votemargin in favor of the United States in a highly contested water case.
Justice Hobbs was appointed by Governor Roy Romer to the Colorado Supreme
Court on April 18, 1996, and was retained for a ten-year term by the Colorado voters in
November of 1998. He has an A.B, in History from the University of Notre Dame.
After graduation with a J.D. from Boalt Hall, University of California, Berkeley, in
1971, he served as law clerk to Tenth CircuitJudge William E. Doyle, then practiced as
an EPA enforcement attorney for two years and a Colorado Assistant Attorney General
for four years. He was a partner with the law firms of Davis, Graham & Stubbs, as well
as Hobbs, Trout & Raley before becoming a justice. For the seventeen years of his
private practice, he represented the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District,
among other water, environmental, land use, and transportation clients. While in
private practice, he represented the Colorado Water Congress in the wilderness water
rights litigation in Colorado federal courts on behalf of water interests opposing the
Sierra Club's assertions that wilderness area designation creates implied reserved water
rights.
* The Honorable Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., State Water Politics Versus an Independent
Judiciary: The Colorado and Idaho Experiences, 20 QUINNIPiAc L. REv. 669 (2001).
Reprinted by permission of QuinnipiacLaw Review.
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Chief Justice Stone's four-to-three opinion held that the
downstream Colorado-Big Thompson Reclamation Project of the
Bureau of Reclamation on the Blue River had storage rights and direct
flow hydropower rights senior to the Denver Water Board's upstream
municipal diversions on the same river.' Justice Silak's three-to-two
opinion held that congressional designation of three downstream
Idaho wilderness areas included federal reserved water rights with
seniority over upstream agricultural, municipal, and commercial
diversions.2
In both instances, Colorado and Idaho state law provided for
contested elections of supreme court justices. During the campaigns,
media attention focused on assertions that the decision would deprive
present and future state water users who depended on upstream
sources of supply of water. While it does not appear that the litigating
parties or their attorneys orchestrated public reaction to the court
decisions, the cases were still pending before the two supreme courts
as the judicial election contests unfolded. Underlying the press
reports on the rehearing petitions were the suggestions that the
pending election might lead the authoring justice to reconsider, the
concurring justices to reconsider, or that defeat of the authoring
justice would bring in a new justice favorable to reversing the one vote
outcome of the case. This situation created speculation that politics
might have motivated the court's original decisions, and any
reconsideration of them. In both instances, the justices authoring the
majority decisions overwhelmingly lost reelection. Their opponents
assumed office under a cloud of partisan controversy.
In the case of Justice Silak, the court granted a rehearing in which
a member of the court's initial majority switched her vote, so that the
dissenting position became the majority. Justice Silak voted for
rehearing, but on rehearing maintained her earlier position and
became the author of a two member dissent. The court announced its
new decision reversing the old, while she was serving out her term.
It appears from the press attention in both decisions, and to the
election races following them, that each justice lost largely because of
one opinion they authored, despite the many they were responsible for
during their judicial service. Many members of the bar held each

1. See City and County of Denver v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d
992 (Colo. 1954).
2. See In re SRBA, No. 24546, 1999 Idaho LEXIS 119, at *1 (Idaho Oct. 1, 1999),
superseded on reh'gby Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260 (Idaho 2000).
3. In 1966, Colorado voters approved a constitutional amendment requiring the
Governor to appoint judges and justices from a list of two or three nominees
forwarded by the nominating commissions. The appointed judge or justice serves for
two years before standing at the next general election for retention, on a yes or no

basis, for a specified term of years. COLO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 20, 24, 25.
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justice in high regard for his and her prior judicial performance.
Nevertheless, given the initial outcry over the decisions, the public
reaction took on a life of its own, eclipsing the merits of both the
besieged justices and the justices' opponents.
The Colorado and Idaho experiences, forty-five years apart,
invoke the ability and commitment of the western states to provide fair
state proceedings in the ongoing McCarran Amendment4
adjudications.
State commitment to fair judicial proceedings
underpins the exercise of jurisdiction under the McCarran
Amendment.
Through this amendment, Congress waived the
sovereign immunity of the United States to suit in state court for
determination of federal agency and tribal water rights claims. This
article first addresses the landscape of the McCarran proceedings and
the intersection of state water politics as viewed through the Colorado
and Idaho experiences. These experiences illustrate the need for state
judiciaries, the water bar, and state officials to recommit to maintain
the appearance and the reality of fairness in state water proceedings
for all parties, regardless of whether their claims are based on state or
federal law.
H. THE MCCARRAN LANDSCAPE
ASK ME
Some time when the river is ice ask me

mistakes I have made. Ask me whether
what I have done is my life. Others
have come in their slow way into
my thought, and some have tried to help

or to hurt: ask me what difference
their strongest love or hate has made.
I will listen to what you say.
You and I can turn and look
at the silent river and wait. We know

the current is there, hidden; and there
are comings and goings from miles away
that hold the stillness exactly before us.
What the river says, that is what I say.
William Stafford5

4.

43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).

5. William Stafford, Ask Me, in THE WAY IT IS: NEW AND SELECTED POEMS BY WILLIAM
STAFFORD 56 (1998).
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A. CREATION OF USE RIGHTS IN WATER, A PUBLIC RESOURCE
Congress carved the states west of the continental divide out of
the public domain from lands it acquired through the 1803 Louisiana
Purchase, the 1846 Oregon Compromise, and the 1848 Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo.6 While the discovery of gold and silver jumpstarted the entire region's settlement, public land and water have been
the most enduring treasures of the West, along with its magnificent
landforms and vistas. Reducing public land and water to possession
and ownership has been a preoccupation of state and territorial law
from the outset!
Congress created wealth in the western states by making the
public land and water available for ownership and use.
The
Homestead Act of 1862,8 the Railroad Acts of 1862 and 1864,' and
other significant statutes resulted in the disposition of two-thirds of the
West's surface acreage into state and private ownership.'l The other
one-third remains in federal ownership," principally comprised of
lands managed by the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land
Management. They include the critical watersheds the states depend
upon for water supply. On them, through them, and from them exist
the reservoirs, rights-of-way, ditches, and pipelines necessary to store
and convey water to farms, cities, and businesses.
Congress early decided to separate legal interests in land and
water. Through federal statutes, it authorized conveyance of patents
to land without interests in water. Water remained a public resource
subject to disposition through the operation of state and federal law.
This was most notable through the 1866 Mining Act" and the 1877
Desert Lands Act.' 4 Congress (1) conceded to the states and territories
jurisdiction to create property interests in the use of all available

LOREN L. MALL, PUBLIC LAND AND MINING LAW 7-8 (3d ed. 1981).
7. For example, Colorado defined "any right to occupy, possess and enjoy any
portion of the public domain" as "a chattel real possessing the legal characterof realestate."
This was a departure from the common law concept of "naked possession," that the
Colorado Supreme Court termed "remarkable." Gillett v. Gaffney, 3 Colo. 351, 358
(1877); see Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Vail Ass'n, 19 P.3d 1263, 1269 n.8 (Colo. 2001).
8. Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392.
9. Railroad Act of 1862, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 489, 492, amended by Railroad Act of
1864, ch. 206, § 4, 13 Stat. 356, 358; see McCormick v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 14 P.3d
346, 352-53 (Colo. 2000).
10. For a review of the public land laws, see MALL, supra note 6; BENJAMIN HORACE
HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES (1965).
11. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A

6.

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS

27-28 (1970) [hereinafter

ONE THIRD

OF THE NATION'S LAND].

12. National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1994);
Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994).
13. The Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251.
14. The Desert Lands Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377.
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unappropriated waters on the public domain, subject to the right of
the government, at anytime in the future, to reserve thenunappropriated waters for federal purposes; and (2) provided for
water users to have occupancy of retained federal land for the purpose
of constructing and maintaining storage and conveyance works
necessary to place the water to use for state and private 'purposes.' 5
The Public Land Law Review Commission, in 1970, reported that
federal lands comprised "the source of most of the water in the
[eleven] coterminous western states, providing approximately 61
percent of the total natural runoff occurring in the region.""
Most western states adopted the custom of appropriation-first in
time of use, first in right for the amount of water placed from the
natural streams to beneficial use-to administer their water
resources.17 California, however, recognized pre-existing riparian
rights. 8 Each state adopted its own water allocation mechanism,
confirming uses solely through judicial proceedings, as in Colorado's
instance,' 9 or through a combination of administrative and judicial
proceedings in the other western states.2"
The western states universally recognize waters of the natural
stream as a public resource. Private rights therein arise only by use of
unappropriated waters, in the amount of the appropriation taken at an
identified point of diversion, for a beneficial use, in order of priority
from the available source of supply, subject to the exercise of prior
uses." Primarily, a water right functions to afford legal protection for
its owner to intercept water in priority at the point of the right's
operation, wherever that is in the watershed within the state. Thus, a
senior water right located downstream commands the passage of the
needed water past the upstream junior users. Historically, large
downstream agricultural rights have exercised this control, requiring
municipal and other later evolving demands for water to either take
the risk of shortage or develop alternative sources of supply.
From their inception, the western territories and states proceeded
15. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 16365 (1935).
16. ONETHIRD OF THENATION'S LAND, supra note 11, at 141.
17. See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447-49 (1882).
18.

JOSEPH

L.

SAX

ET AL.,

LEGAL CONTROL

OF WATER

RESOURCES:

CASES

AND

MATERIALS 295-97 (3d ed. 2000).

19. See Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado's 1969 Adjudication and Administration Act:
Settling In, 3 U. DENV. WATERL. REv. 1, 19 (1999).
20. SeeJohn E. Thorson, State Watershed Adjudications:Approaches and Alternatives, 42
ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. §§ 22-01, 22-06 to 22-08 (1996); SAX ETAL., supranote 18, at
183-87.
21. See generally SAX ETAL., supra note 18, at 280-309; see, e.g., Santa Fe Trail Ranches
Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 53-54 (Colo. 1999) (holding that
diversions made pursuant to a decreed water right, when not used for decreed uses, do
not establish historical use for the purposes of a change of water right proceeding).
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without interruption to create property rights in water under
territorial and state law. Four significant events that altered the states'
presumed sole possession of the field occurred at the turn of the
nineteenth century. First, the federal forest reservations came into
being under the 1897 Forest Organic Act, which included a state and
federal water law savings provision." Second, with the passage of the
1902 Reclamation Act, 2 which directed that federal projects obtain

water rights in accordance with state law, the United States began to
construct and manage those projects both for the benefit of state and
local sponsors, and to achieve ancillary federal purposes, such as
recreation, flood control, and power production. Third, in 1907, the
United States Supreme Court, in a case involving a tribal reservation, 4
determined that federal reservations-in the absence of an express
reservation of water-carry with them an implied reservation of
sufficient, unappropriated water necessary to prevent defeat of the
reservation's primary purposes.25 Finally, the Supreme Court, in 1907,
first exercised its original jurisdiction to resolve water allocation
disputes between states, fashioning the law of equitable apportionment
of interstate streams.26 This, in turn, gave rise to a fifth major
occurrence; creation of interstate water compacts, which Congress
approved in the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution in
the 1920s. 7
Hence, from the earliest part of the twentieth century, the states
have known of the existence of retained congressional authority to
reserve unappropriated waters for federal purposes. An 1899 Supreme
Court case presaged the Winters doctrine, 28 and the year before the
enactment of the 1964 Wilderness Act, the Supreme Court applied the
reserved rights doctrine not only to Native American reservations, but
also to certain recreation and wildlife areas, and a national forest as
well. 29 The states themselves encouraged the federal government to
have a significant role concerning intrastate and interstate streams,
primarily to secure federal funding for water projects they could not
22.
23.
24.

National Forest Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 481 (1994).
Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1994).
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).

25. Id. at 577.
26. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117-18 (1907).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; see e.g., Colorado River Compact, 1923 Colo. Sess.
Laws 684; COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-61-101 (2001) (Boulder Canyon Project Act ratifying
the Colorado River Compact, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1994)).
28. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
29. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). See also California v. United
States, 438 U.S. 645, 662 (1978) ("except where the reserved rights or navigation
servitude of the United States are invoked, the State has total authority over its
internal waters"); Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1955)
(upholding authority of Federal Power Commission to license power projects on
reserved lands, subject to prior vested rights).
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afford or did not choose to finance themselves. In regard to the
reclamation program, the states understood that the Bureau of
Reclamation would hold water rights appropriated under state law,
originally for the benefit of agricultural users, later extended to a
variety of purposes, including municipal, industrial, power production,
flood control, fish and recreation, and water compact deliveries.30 The
tribal rights" and agency rights for the primary purpose of federal
reservations, however, were another matter; these rights arose out of
federal law, in particular congressional exercise of the property
clause."2
B. THE INTEREST OF THE STATES IN ADJUDICATING FEDERAL CLAIMS
The immunity of the United States to compelled appearance in
state court proceedings became an increasing problem as the states
continued to exercise their congressionally conferred and repeatedly
recognized authority to create water rights in unappropriated public
waters. Whether state law based, as with reclamation projects, or
federal law based, as with tribal and federal land reservations, state
forums did not determine the United States' water rights. Whatever
litigation occurred to determine federally held water rights occurred
in federal court, while the states proceeded on a separate track as to
state based claims not owned by the United States government.
The situation became intolerable to the western states. 3 The
security and dependability of water rights turn on the enforceability of
their priority in times of short river supply. 4

The right to divert a

certain amount of water from the available natural stream supply at a
specific location, to the exclusion of all others not then in priority, is
the essence of a water right. The reason for adjudicating a federal
reserved water right is the same as all other rights to the use of waterto realize the value and expectations that enforcement of that right's
priority secure. 5 In times of short supply, water users depend on the
state to exercise its police power to curtail junior uses in favor of senior
uses, regardless of the identity of the owner of the right, state or
federal. To accomplish this, managers must determine the amount
and priority of rights drawing on the watershed.
Because the states could not haul the federal agencies and tribes
30. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Crystal Creek Homeowners' Ass'n, 14 P.3d 325, 32940, 342 (Colo. 2000).
31. Susan M. Williams, The Winters Doctrine On Water Administration, 36 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INsT. §§ 24-1, 24-6 to 24-8 (1990).
32. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
33. Thorson, supra note 20, §§ 22-16 to 22-24.
34. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Assoc. v. Moyer, No. 00SA211, 2001 Colo. LEXIS
1061 (Colo. Dec. 17, 2001).
35. Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Colo. 1982).

Issue 1

STATE WATER POLITICS

into state court, they were unable to secure reliability for state-created
water rights and meet future needs due to uncertainty about the
nature, extent, and priority of federal water rights.
In sum,
administration of rights within the watershed, who gets to divert, and
who does not, cannot occur in the absence of comprehensive
identification and adjudication of all rights, state or federal.
Accordingly, after a prolonged effort and over the resistance of
the Justice Department and federal agencies, Congress passed the
1952 McCarran Amendment permitting state joinder of the United
States and Indian tribes in state court water adjudications 6 In order
to assert this jurisdiction, states relying primarily on administrative
mechanisms commenced comprehensive adjudications to determine
the rights of all users, including federal entities.
Three Colorado cases that the United States Supreme Court
ultimately decided established that federal courts and state courts,
under the McCarran legislation, have concurrent jurisdiction to
determine federal rights. However, when a McCarran proceeding
begins in the state court, the federal court should defer to the state
judicial determination of the federal rights, whether or not the federal
litigation preceded the state litigation.37
Implicit in the refusal of federal courts to exercise their
concurrent jurisdiction is that federal agencies and tribes have equal
access to fair state judicial forums, along with state and private
claimants. As Justice Brennan wrote for the Court in Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States,38 which recognized the
authority of the states to join tribal claims under McCarran:
We emphasize, however, that we do not overlook the heavy obligation
[of the federal courts] to exercise jurisdiction. We need not decide,
for example, whether, despite the McCarran Amendment, dismissal
would be warranted if more extensive proceedings had occurred in
the District Court prior to dismissal, if the involvement of state water
rights were less extensive than it is here, or if the state proceeding

were in some respect inadequate to resolve the federal claims.3 9

Additionally, when a state joins the United States in a McCarran
proceeding, the United States must assert all federal claims to water
rights; if not, the court may concede the priority of the federal rights,

36. Bennett W. Raley, Chaos in the Making: The Consequences of Failure to Integrate
FederalEnvironmental Statutes with McCarran Amendment Water Adjudications, 41 Rocay

§§ 24-04 (1995).
37. The Colorado Trilogy: Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 810, 820 (1976); United States v. Dist. Court, 401 U.S. 527, 530 (1971);
MTN. MrN. L. INST.

United States v. Dist. Court, 401 U.S. 520, 525 (1971).
38. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
39. Id. at 820.
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including both reserved and appropriative rights, to intervening state
and private junior rights.40 In turn, this has compelled federal
agencies and tribes to participate in litigation they might otherwise
have postponed or foregone entirely.
Congressional adoption of a plethora of environmental laws,
starting in the 1960s, has caused federal agencies to manage their
lands with greater attention to values other than resource extraction,
such as recreation, fish and wildlife, wild and scenic rivers, national
parks, and wilderness area preservation, among others. Members of
the water bar have pointed out that failure of the United States to
claim state or federal appropriative water rights for environmental
purposes, such as endangered species protection, defeats the purposes
of the McCarran Amendment and the federal environmental laws,
since reserved water rights either will not exist or will be uncertain.
The argument is that a secure water right, administered in priority visa-vis other water rights, is the most rational and consistent way to
accommodate important state and federal interests in water. Resorting
to regulatory mechanisms on an ad hoc basis, such as by-pass flows the
Forest Service can impose as a condition for right-of-way permit
renewal, diminishes the yield of pre-existing water rights, undermines
reliability, promotes disorder, intensifies hostility, leads to takings
actions, and generally favors chaos over law.41
In short, whether for a traditional type of consumptive use, such
as agricultural or municipal, a non-consumptive use, such as
hydropower, flood control, or environmental uses, federal officials and
agencies who do not assert federal water rights claims in the McCarran
proceedings may be in dereliction of their congressionally assigned
public duties. When these claims are asserted, state judges must give
them fair consideration and uphold federal ownership of rights that
have a basis in either state or federal law, regardless of political
controversy within the state over the filing, existence, nature, or extent
of the claims.
McCarran adjudications are underway in the state courts of
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada,
Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, with Texas already having
completed a comprehensive adjudication."
The United States
40. United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1986).
41. Raley, supra note 36, § 24-06. The problem for federal agencies with this
approach is that such claims provoke intense state political reaction and litigation, as
the federal filings in Idaho's Snake River Basin adjudication illustrate. The right of
the United States to obtain appropriative rights under federal law, in contradistinction
to state law, has also been highly controversial and, although the western states, except
for New Mexico, have state law mechanisms for instream flow water rights, they
typically hold these in state ownership and do not allow federal agencies or others to
appropriate or hold them.
42. Thorson, supra note 20, § 22-05. For example, the Arizona proceedings involve
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Constitution vests the authority in state judges to apply both state and
federal law. Pursuant to the supremacy clause, they must uphold
federal law when there is federal preemption. 4 The experiences of
Colorado and Idaho, sparked by the majority opinions of Justices
Stone and Silak, demonstrate the magnitude of the legal and
governmental issues involved, and go straight to the heart of
federalism, separation of powers, and the ability of judges to refrain
from political influence in making decisions.
II. THE COLORADO EXPERIENCE
I tell you, gentlemen, you are piling up
a heritage of conflict and litigation
over water rights, for there is not
sufficient water to supply these lands.
John Wesley Powel

44

In October of 1954, the Colorado Supreme Court issued its
opinion in the Blue River case, pitting Denver's claims for municipal
supply against a United States reclamation project.4 5 At that time,
Colorado law provided for contested election ofjudges. The author of
the four-to-three decision, Chief Justice Mortimer Stone, was up for
reelection in November. He had drawn a ballot challenger.
The case was highly significant. It involved the water right
priorities of the City and County of Denver, the City of Colorado
Springs, seven counties of northeastern Colorado, and fifteen counties
of Colorado's western slope, which encompasses most of Colorado's
future demand for surface water. The principal focus was the relative
priorities of Dillon Reservoir and Green Mountain Reservoir, which is
situated not far downstream from Dillon on the same river.46
Congress had authorized Green Mountain Reservoir as part of the
Colorado-Big Thompson Project ("C-BT").
The Bureau of
Reclamation administered the project, designed to provide 100,000
acre-feet of water per year for future uses on the western slope of
Colorado's continental divide, and 240,000 acre-feet of water per year
77,000 water right claims, and the Idaho Snake River proceedings involve 185,000
claims. Id.
43. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
44. JOHN WESLEY POWELL, OFFIcIAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL IRRIGATION
CONGRESS 109, 112 (1893), quoted in DONALD WORSTER, A RIVER RUNNING WEST: THE
LIFE OFJOHN WESLEY PowELL 529 (2001).

45. See generally City and County of Denver v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276
P.2d 992, 1012 (Colo. 1954) (holding that, following the Act of 1877, all non-navigable
waters, then a part of the public domain, became publici juris, subject to the plenary
control of designated states).
46. Id. at 995-97.
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to the seven county area of northeastern Colorado for agricultural,
municipal, and industrial uses. The project authorized construction of
a trans-mountain diversion tunnel running west to east under the
surface of Rocky Mountain National Park.47
Green Mountain Reservoir would store an additional 52,000-acre
feet of water to provide replacement water for senior uses on the
western slope drawing on Colorado River water, thereby allowing outof-priority diversions to northeastern Colorado. Power production at
the Green Mountain site would help repay the United States for C-BT
construction costs, along with project power features on the eastern
slope, and the repayment obligations of the Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District ("Northern District"), the project's northeastern
Colorado sponsor. The water users of the fifteen county Colorado
River Water Conservation District ("River District")
were the primary
48
Reservoir.
Mountain
Green
of
beneficiaries
The agreement between northeastern Colorado and the western
slope water interests was an elevated achievement. Colorado is the
state of the Great Divide, hydrologically and politically. Eighty percent
of the average annual precipitation arises on the western slope; eighty
percent of the population and much of the irrigable acreage of the
state lies on the eastern slope. The River District and the Northern
District, both established in 1937, safeguard the water interests of their
regions.49 The authorizing legislation for formation of the Northern
District required mitigation to the western slope for trans-mountain
diversions from the natural basin of the Colorado River within the
state. 5° Congressman Ed Taylor of the western slope had successfully
insisted on provisions in the congressional authorization requiring
construction of the Green Mountain Reservoir, the western slope
protective feature, before any of the features designed to benefit the
eastern slope. 5'
The Bureau of Reclamation proceeded with construction of the CBT Project commencing with Green Mountain Reservoir, as Congress
had directed, however, litigation over water rights priorities was
inevitable. 2 The City and County of Denver, proceeding with its own
financial resources and free of any state or federal legislative
provisions, planned on constructing Dillon Reservoir to divert Blue
River waters through its own trans-mountain tunnels for use in the City
47. See generally DANIEL TYLER, THE LAST WATER HOLE IN THE WEST: THE COLORADOBIG THOMPSON PROJECT AND THE NORTHERN COLORADO WATER CONSERvANCY DISTRICT

(1992).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.

52.

TYLER, supra note 47, at 205-15.
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and County and its service areas in the mushrooming metropolitan
53
area.
Although a water right arises only from actual application of water
to a beneficial use, Colorado law allows for relating the priority date of
the water right back to the date when the claimant took its first act
evidencing the intent to appropriate a certain amount of available
unappropriated water at a specific location for beneficial use, provided
that construction of the project proceeds with reasonable diligence. 4
The relation back doctrine thereby permits the appropriator the time
required to engineer, finance, and construct the water works necessary
to use the water.
Relying on an appropriation date of 1935 for the Colorado-Big
Thompson Project, the two districts-allied as they were in the
construction and operation of the federal reclamation projectclaimed that Denver had not been diligent in pursuing its Blue River
claims. Denver had asserted a 1921 date for Dillon Reservoir based on
its overall planning for a comprehensive water system along the
eastern and western slope sources.5 ' Refusing to appear in the state
court suit pre-McCarran, the United States filed a parallel suit in the
Colorado Federal District Court.
The Colorado Supreme Court's decision provided a date of 1946
based on Denver starting work on the Montezuma trans-mountain
tunnel that year.56 Concluding that Denver had not been diligent in
pursuing its Blue River claims, the court postponed the City and
County's asserted earlier priority in favor of the federally held priority
for the C-BT Project. The dissent-signed by the only three judges
from the Denver metropolitan area-declared that because of
Denver's work on its comprehensive water system, the City and County
had been diligent and was entitled to the earlier date.58
Denver newspapers proclaimed calamity and sided with the
dissent. Denver faced a dry future because the majority, through
Justice Stone, had turned control of the Blue River over to the United
States. The Denver Post started its coverage on October 19, 1954, in an
article reporting a rumor that the Colorado Supreme Court was close
to ruling against Denver in the proposed Blue River diversion case. 9
The rumored outcome was four-to-three against Denver. The Post said
there were "reports that attempts were being made by the state
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Sieber v. Frink, 2 P. 901, 903 (Colo. 1884).
See generally TYLER, supra note 47.
Id.
Id.

58. Id.

59. Bert Hanna & Nello Cassai, 4-3 Decision Against City, Lawyers Told, DENY. POST,
Oct. 18, 1954, at 1.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 5

Republican high command to hold up the decision until after the
election because of jolting political aspects." ° Attorneys told the Post
that the decision "means that Denver has no legal right to 177,000
acre-feet of water" sought from the Blue River.6'
The court issued its opinion late in the afternoon of the day the
Post's morning edition had broken the story. The next day, October
20, the Post reported that the priority date awarded to Denver of June
24, 1946, would "entitle Denver only to a little surplus flood water in
wet years."62 Justice Stone had "doomed" Denver's future. A "Denver
spokesman," commenting on the decision, said, "the city will make no
attempt to divert the 788 second-feet permitted, declaring that such
diversion would not be financially feasible., 63 An accompanying
editorial asserted that "[t] he effect of the decision is to award virtually
the entire flow of the Blue [R] iver to Green Mountain reservoir, a part
of the Colorado-Big Thompson project, and to the Green Mountain
hydro plant where the government generates electricity."64
On October 26, the Denver Post endorsed Justice Stone's
opponent, Henry S. Lindsley, stating: 'Justice Stone wrote the recent
majority opinion of the state supreme court which constituted a
serious blow to Denver's plans for increasing its dwindling water
supply by tapping the Blue River." 65 The Post acknowledged that
Discounting
'Justice Stone has been a distinguished jurist... "66
political motivations of its own, the Post nevertheless said that Justice
Stone should go, maintaining that although judges should not base
decisions on politics, "it is important, however, that younger men be
elected to the court whenever younger men of demonstrated
knowledge, understanding and character are offered as candidates." 6'
Justice Stone was seventy-two; his opponent, fifty-one.
Denver filed for rehearing and a series of Post stories and columns
up to election day speculated on the severe damage dealt to Denver
and the chances of a rehearing-and reversal-if Justice Stone's
opponent was elected. Newspapers in northeastern Colorado and on
the western slope countered with articles, columns, and editorials in
favor ofJustice Stone's decision and his retention.
On the first Tuesday of November 1954, a flood of Denver
metropolitan votes took Justice Stone down.68 The Denver Water
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
1954,

Id.
Id.
City Failed to Establish Claim, JuristSays, DENV. POST, Oct. 19, 1954, at 2.
Id.
Editorial, The Supreme Court vs. a Growing City, DENV.POST, Oct. 20, 1954, at 16.
Editorial, On SelectingJudges, DENV. POST, Oct. 26, 1954, at 16.
Id.
Id.
Bert Hanna, Denver's Vote Decisive in Supreme Court Race, DENY. POST, Nov. 3,
at 23.
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Board filed successive rehearing petitions, including one after Justice
Lindsley had taken his place on the court. Justice Lindsley refused to
vote for rehearing;69 as a result, Justice Stone's opinion stood.
The Colorado Supreme Court's decision produced a settlement in
In return for a power
the federal court case the next year.
interference agreement, that would store and divert water otherwise
required to run through the turbines at Green Mountain dam
downstream of Dillon Reservoir, in 1955, Denver stipulated to the
senior priority of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project. Today, Denver
operates Dillon Reservoir as its premier water storage reservoir; the CBT Project has a long record of service to Northeastern Colorado; and
the 100,000 acre-feet of water in Green Mountain Reservoir is fully
subscribed for western slope uses, mainly providing replacement water
for junior out-of-priority diversions on the western slope subject to
curtailment otherwise.70
In 1966, Colorado voters approved a state constitutional
amendment abolishing contested judicial races, in favor of citizencommission nomination of trial court and appellate court candidates,
followed by Gubernatorial appointment, and a retention/nonretention vote for a term of years after two years of service. Upon
Justice Stone's death, the Colorado Supreme Court presided over a
eulogy to his excellence as a justice and the example his reelection
defeat has set for a better way of selecting and retaining judges. Said
Leonard Campbell, a leader of the Colorado Bar Association, on this
occasion:
I listened and remembered well when Alden Hill spoke about the
election of 1954 when Mortimer Stone was defeated, improperly
defeated in the election held that year. Perhaps it's somewhat fitting
as a Denverite born here, somewhat related on occasion to the Water
Department, that we acknowledge what has been acknowledged
countless times, that never was there an election for any judge of this
Supreme Court that was more discussed after the election in which

69. Justice Holland, one of the dissenting justices, explained that he and his fellow
dissenters and the new member of the court, Justice Lindsley, "unhesitatingly
participated in the matter of the denial of the last of the subsequent motions [for
rehearing] as proper procedure to establish finality as is proper in this, as well as other
litigated cases," despite the dissent of the three and the arrival of a new judge who had
not participated in the majority's decision. See City and County of Denver v. N. Colo.
Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d 992, 1023 (Colo. 1954) (Holland,J., dissenting).
70. Every one of these water features helps to put Colorado's entitlement under the
Colorado River Compact to use within the state, while serving important recreational
and environmental needs. Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 690
(Colo. 2001). Particularly in the headwater counties of Grand, Summit, and Eagle,
home to ski area, summer resort, and residential development, the western slope's
recreational and residential economy is largely possible because of replacement
releases from Green Mountain Reservoir, permitting out-of-priority diversions. In re
Application of Denver, 935 F.2d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 1991).
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the judge gained in stature; he gained in stature every time that it was
discussed; and never was it more clearly demonstrated that there was
a deficiency in the elective process that did not return him to office."'
After his defeat, Justice Stone went on to serve as a referee with
the National Railroad Adjustment Board and Mediation Board,
deciding dockets of disputes between railroads and their employees.
He died twenty-four years after his election defeat; he was ninety-five.
IV. THE IDAHO EXPERIENCE
Ideals and actions do not automatically coincide. Given the history of
Idaho's irrigated landscape, a corollary might be added to this basic
observation. A belief that humans should conquer and exploit the
environment does not necessarily mean that they will actually achieve
their objectives. As the irrigated landscape showed, nature often
72
eluded ideals: a conquest myth did not produce a conquered land.
In October 1999, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion on
wilderness water rights in the Snake River Basin McCarran
adjudication." Idaho provides for the contested election ofjudges but
without party identification. If a candidate in the primary does not
obtain a majority vote, a run-off election occurs as part of the general
election. The author of the three-to-two decision, Justice Cathy Silak,
was up for reelection. The controversy over her opinion drew a ballot
opponent who defeated her overwhelmingly.
Inconclusive Colorado litigation had preceded this case. The
Idaho case involved the United States Forest Service's assertion of
implied federal reserved water rights for three wilderness areas,
portions of which were downstream of agricultural, municipal, and
mining water uses. Although the Sierra Club had brought federal
litigation against the Forest Service in Colorado seeking to compel it to
claim wilderness water rights, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to do so, and found the case hypothetical and nonreviewable. 7 4
The Colorado Federal District Court had ruled in favor of the theory
of such rights, but stated its inability to order the Forest Service to
adjudicate them. Instead, it ordered the Forest Service to devise a plan
to protect wilderness water resources in the absence of obtaining water

71. See Proceedings in the Supreme Court of Colorado, Friday, April 14, 1978, to
honor the memory of the late Honorable Mortimer Stone as a Justice and Chief
Justice of the Court, in unpaginated preface to 195 Colo. (1978).
72. MARK FIEGE, IRRIGATED EDEN, THE MAKING OF AN AGRICULTURAL LANDSCAPE IN
THE AMERICAN WEST 207-08 (1999).

73. See generally In re SRBA, No. 24546, 1999 Idaho LEXIS 119, at *1 (Idaho Oct. 1,
1999) (affirming the district court's order granting the United States's reserved water
rights for the Frank Church River of No Return, the Selway-Bitter Root, and the
Gospel-Hump Wilderness Areas).

74. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1421 (10th Cir. 1990).
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rights for them." Because the Tenth Circuit found the case not ripe
for decision, it vacated the district court's holding.
Colorado water user interests had intervened in the Sierra Club
litigation with an eye towards the proposed designation of downstream
wilderness areas on forest lands in the state. In these instances,
reservation of a wilderness water right could block future upstream
water development on non-wilderness lands.76
In Idaho, the designation of wilderness areas downstream of
developing lands had already occurred. The Forest Service, therefore,
undertook in Idaho's McCarran proceedings to meet its perceived
responsibility for asserting the existence of federal reserved water
rights for wilderness areas, where such rights could make a difference
in protecting wilderness water resources. Namely, for the SelwayBitterroot (designated by Congress in 1964)," 7 the Gospel-Hump
(designated by Congress in 1978) 7' and the Frank Church River of No
Return (designated by Congress in 1980) 79 wilderness areas.
The wilderness water rights claims were highly controversial from
the outset.
Cities, irrigation districts, and mining and timber
companies contested them both in the trial court and on appeal. The
state district court judge, conducting the comprehensive Snake River
Basin Adjudication, ruled in favor of the federal wilderness water
rights claims, as well as those for national recreation areas and wild
and scenic rivers in Idaho.
Idaho water users filed a brief arguing that the doctrine of
implied reserved water rights is an anachronism. They argued that
when Congress raises and debates the water issue, then fails to resolve
it, as with the Wilderness Act, the courts should refuse to act to imply a
reserved water right, for this would violate separation of powers. In
such a circumstance, they asserted, the New Mexico doctrine of
deference to state water law should apply to the case rather than the
Winters doctrine. In United States v. New Mexico,80 the United States
Supreme Court held that instream flows for fish and wildlife,
recreation, and other multiple uses of forest lands, were secondary
purposes of national forest designation, the primary purposes being

75. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. 1490, 1503-04 (D. Colo. 1987); Sierra Club v.
Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 866-67 (D. Colo. 1985).
76. The subsequent 1993 Colorado Wilderness Act-mostly headwaters areas, but
including three downstream segments-disclaimed the creation of wilderness reserved
water rights as a result of that particular designation, while preserving any pre-existing
federal rights in the areas. Colorado Wilderness Act of 1993, § 8, Pub. L. No. 103-77,
107 Stat. 756, 762-64.
77. See Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890.
78. Act of Feb. 24, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-237, 92 Stat. 43.

79.

Act ofJuly 23, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-312, 94 Stat. 948.

80.

United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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timber production and water production for western settlers.
Accordingly, the water users contended that implied reserved water
rights do not exist for wilderness designations.
A majority of the Idaho Supreme Court justices agreed with the
adjudication court. Justice Silak's opinion relied on the Winters
doctrine, as other United States Supreme Court decisions have
interpreted it, spelling out the doctrine of implied reserved water
rights to prevent defeat of the primary purposes of federal
reservations."
As Judge John Kane had done in his vacated Colorado Federal
District Court decision, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that
congressional designation of wilderness areas on forest lands is a new
reservation overlaid on an existing one, the primary purpose of which
is to protect the wilderness values existing as of the date of
designation." Because water is an essential attribute of wilderness, a
federal water right is necessary to prevent its impairment. Justice Silak
wrote:
Through the Wilderness Act, Congress established a new category of
federal lands-the national Wilderness Preservation System. Unlike
the MUSYA [Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act], the Wilderness
Act prescribes a unique management scheme that clearly aims to
preserve the wilderness character of the designated lands. The
designation of the Wilderness Areas at issue in this case continued

the withdrawal of these areas from the public domain. Moreover, it is
also clear that the Wilderness Areas were established for the purpose
of wilderness preservation.
Therefore, we conclude that the
congressional designations of the Wilderness Areas are reservations of
land established for the primary purpose of wilderness protection
and preservation."
Citing the opaque language of the 1964 Wilderness Act regarding
water rights, " 'nothing in this Act shall constitute an express or
implied claim or denial on the part of the Federal Government as to
exemption from the [s]tate water laws', ,85 the majority concluded that
wilderness designation did not create an express federal reserved water
right.8 6 It then undertook to determine the existence of an implied

81. Id. at 710. Applying New Mexico, the Idaho Supreme Court unanimously
decided in another case that the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960 did not
create an express or implied reservation of water. United States v. City of Challis, 988
P.2d 1199, 1207 (Idaho 1999).
82. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1976); Arizona v. California,

373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
83.

InreSRBA, No. 24546, 1999 Idaho LEXIS 119, at *19-20 (Idaho Oct. 1, 1999).

84. Id.
85. Id. at *20.
86. Id.
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7
reserved water right.1

The majority opinion focused on the central function of Idaho
water law-to provide for the future appropriation of unappropriated,
unreserved water-versus the forceful language of Congress regarding
its intent to preserve the wilderness areas as they were at the time of
their designation:
Idaho law provides that all non-reserved, unappropriated water
within the state is subject to appropriation to further domestic and
economic

development

...

A

review

of

the

Wilderness

Act

demonstrates that the prior appropriation doctrine is inconsistent
with congressional intent to preserve the wilderness character of the

Wilderness Areas."8

The three-member majority determined that the wilderness water
reservation was for all the water:
As discussed above, the appropriation of water from within the
Wilderness Areas would defeat Congress's [sic] primary purpose of
preserving the unimpaired wilderness character of the areas. The
Wilderness Act makes clear Congress' intention that the Wilderness
Areas "be administered ... in such manner as will leave them
unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to
provide for.., the preservation of their wilderness character." ...
Congress defined wilderness as "an area of undeveloped Federal land
retaining its primeval character and influence, without permanent
improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed
so as to preserve its natural conditions." ... Water is required to
effectuate the purpose of maintaining wilderness in its pristine
natural condition. Because removing water necessarily impairs the
natural state of the wilderness lands, Congress must have intended to
reserve all unappropriated water.... Therefore, we hold that the
SRBA district court correctly concluded that the entire
unappropriated amount of water within the Wilderness Areas is
necessary to accomplish the purposes of wilderness preservation and
protection."
The majority did not address the water users argument that the
implied reserved water right doctrine is an anachronism and creates
separation of powers problems if applied to wilderness designations.
The separation of powers problem arises because courts cannot
legislate to create a water right when Congress has raised the issue but
has declined to resolve it.
The dissent wrote that implied reserved water rights cannot exist
when it is clear that Congress has taken up the water issue and has not
87. Id. at *20-24.
88. In reSRBA, 1999 Idaho LEXIS 119, at *24.
89. Id. at *27-28.
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expressly reserved unappropriated water. 90 The language no claim/no
denial of exemption from state water law, it said, meant Congress
intended no claim for wilderness water rights.9 The dissent also
concluded that wilderness designation is a management directive to
the administering agency, not a reservation overlying an original
Forest reservation.
Reacting to a torrent of immediate and widespread adverse
reaction to the decision across Idaho that took on a life of its own, The
Idaho Statesman editorialized on October 14, 1999, for Justice Silak's
reelection defeat:
Through the hand-wringing over Idaho's water rights, there is one
quick-fix solution available to voters: elect a new Supreme Court

justice. Justice Cathy Silak, who on Oct. 1 wrote the explosive
opinion that turns over water rights in wilderness areas to the federal
government, is up for re-election in May. Hers is the only seat that
will be available. That leaves an opening for anybody who thinks she
was in error in assuming the intent of Congress to give the federal
government rights over Idaho's wilderness water.

The editors went on to opine that Silak "should be well aware"
that not a single Idaho politician in the last thirty-plus years,
"Democrat or Republican," would dare run on a platform allowing the
federal government "to control every drop of water in designated areas
of the state."94 While the editorial said it was too early to tell whether
an opponent could defeat her based on one decision, the
"controversial ruling was approved on a [three-to-two] vote, so all it
takes is one change on the [s]upreme [c]ourt-one individual who
demonstrates a greater
sensitivity to what's at stake, which is Idaho's
9

water sovereignty."

The Statesman said that "[s] ome state leaders warn that thousands
of Idaho water users, including Treasure Valley residents, could lose
their right to use water for drinking, farming, and making microchips.
Farmers are especially worried about their livelihoods coming to an
end and fields turning to sagebrush. 96 The trial attorney for the
United States was reported as saying it was not the government's aim
to claim every drop of water allocated since 1980. The editorial
90. Id. at *38 (Kidwell,J., dissenting).
91. Id. at*41.
92. Id. at *47.
93.

Editorial, Idahoans Could Place Water Rights Issue In Their Hands,

IDAHO

STATESMAN, Oct. 14, 1999, at 6b. The author thanks reporter Dan Popkey of the Idaho
Statesman for the courtesy of providing articles and editorials of that newspaper
appearing over the course of the election controversy.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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concluded that "[i]f Silak wants to help her cause, she could push for a
rehearing on this case and be open to changing her mind. Her future
on the Idaho Supreme Court may depend on what she does on this
issue.""
Shortly after this editorial appeared, the court granted a
rehearing. Justice Silakjoined in the vote to grant rehearing. A state
district judge filed his candidacy to run against her. On March 13,
2000, The Statesman reported that Justice Silak's adversary had recused
himself from further proceedings at the trial court level in a
controversial school finance case because, in his view, the Idaho
Supreme Court had rewritten the Idaho Constitution, and for him to
implement the court's decision would be to violate his oath of office.9
The Statesman also quoted a state republican legislator as saying,
"'Three strikes against this court, and especially against Cathy Silak.
She's out.... We have to send that message. If we can't do it
legislatively, by tying their hands, then we've got to send a message by
replacing her'." 99 The article said, "Critics, including virtually every
elected official in Idaho, contend the court misinterpreted
congressional
intent on reserved water rights in the 1964 Wilderness
" 100
Act.
Justice Silak attempted to respond by pointing to her record. The
Statesman, on April 29, 2000, quoted the Boise attorney chairingJustice
Silak's reelection campaign as saying that the court's five justices
issued unanimous rulings in seventy-four of eighty-eight cases before
them and Justice Silak had filed only three dissents.'
Asked to
respond, Justice Silak's opponent pointed to her vote in the school
funding and water rights decisions as indicative of her disregard for
the law. 02
Within days of the upcoming election, The Statesman-reviewing
the judicial record and statements of both candidates-reversed its
initial editorial suggestion that voters should oust Justice Silak from
office. It endorsed her reelection:

97. Id.
98. Mark Warbis, Tempers Run Hot Over High Court's Recent Rulings, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Mar. 13, 2000, at lb.

99. Id. The reference to three strikes was to a case where the Idaho Supreme Court
had overruled a lower-court decision absolving St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
of an employee's molestation of a minor, the public schools case where the court
determined that the state had a constitutional obligation to ensure that students can
attend public schools that provide "a safe environment, conducive to learning," and
the wilderness water rights case. Id.
100. Id.
101. Candidate Takes on Justice Silak's Record of Rulings, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 29,
2000, at lb.
102. Id.
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Silak's record shows no evidence of judicial activism. Last year, she
sided with the court's majority in 93 out of 96 published opinions;
this is hardly the record of a maverick. Silak declined to answer the
same religious questionnaire [her opponent] answered, saying it
would be unethical to discuss her opinion. She's right.'03
The editorial pointed out thatJustice Silak's opponent had:
answered an endorsement questionnaire from a religious group,
where he discussed his evangelism, opposition to abortion and deeply
held belief in creationism and his conviction that the Bible is the
source of our moral law.... Revealing religious and moral views for a
political endorsement leaves the public0 4 to question [his] detachment
and erode confidence in his decisions.
Justice Silak fell to overwhelming defeat on May 23. Although she
attributed her defeat to "partisanship" and not necessarily her water
opinion, 0 The Statesman on May 27, 2000, quoted a political analyst as
saying that her vote in support of federal water rights was the likely

cause. 1 06 "Water rights is the third rail of Idaho politics.... Because of
that decision, most of the focus was on her. Even though there was a
lot of good reporting on [her opponent's] missteps, the focus was on
water rights.' 07 The election campaign cost both candidates a total of
$290,000, with Justice Silak slightly outspending her successful
opponent.0 8
On October 27, 2000, with the election five months behind, the
Idaho Supreme Court reversed directions, determining that no
implied federal reserved water rights existed for the three wilderness
areas.' °9 The lead opinion for the new majority stated that "It]he
language of the Wilderness Act indicates that it sets aside land and
prohibits its development, nothing more.""0
Accordingly, the
wilderness designation has no extraterritorial effect on water
103. Editorial, Justice Silak Has Experience and Judicial Temperament, IDAHO
May 21, 2000, at 10b.
104. Id.
105.

STATESMAN,

Ken Miller, Silak Blames PartisanshipforLoss More than Water Rights Ruling, IDAHO
May 27, 2000, at 6a. Idaho's system of scheduling judicial elections at the

STATESMAN,

time of the party primaries may accentuate former party affiliations, although the
judicial election is theoretically non-partisan. Media coverage regarding the Idaho
election continuously reported that a democratic governor had appointed Justice
Silak, and she had been active in democratic politics before taking office.
Approximately, 86 percent of the total votes cast in the primary election were
Republican.
106. Ken Miller, Politics Under Scrutiny After CourtElection, IDAHO STATESMAN, May 27,
2000, at la.
107. Id.
108. Supreme Court Race was Most Costly Ever, IDAHO STATESMAN, June 23, 2000, at lb.
109. Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260, 1266 (Idaho 2000).
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development outside of wilderness boundaries. "A clear indication of
the creation of implied water rights as claimed by the United States
does not exist in the language of the Wilderness Act or in its legislative
history.""'
Specially concurring, the chief justice questioned the continued
viability of the Winters doctrine. "Where, as in this case, Congress has
chosen for whatever reason, not to create an express water right
despite its knowledge of a potential conflict, I believe it can no longer
be inferred that such a right is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the
reservation.""2 She said to The Statesman on October 28, 2000, that
"the suggestion that she had made a political rather than legal
decision [was] 'insulting'.""' Acknowledging that, "'You're asking a
question that's fair game'," the chief justice explained that she had
changed her mind based on the briefs and the oral argument on
rehearing, lengthy discussion, and her own lengthy restudy of the
applicable law."'
The Times-News issue of October 28, 2000, quoted Idaho's
Governor as saying the "[slupreme [c]ourt made the right call," and
the Idaho Deputy Attorney General's office as saying the new ruling
"'reaffirmed the long-standing principle of primacy of state water
law'."..
Pointing to the existence of more than 150,000 water rights
claims in thirty-eight counties involved in the pending Snake River
Basin adjudication, the Speaker of Idaho's House of Representatives
proclaimed, "[i] t gets us to where we can, in the negotiations and the
mediations, proceed from a position of strength rather than a
defensive posture.""6
In light of the Idaho experience, The Statesman editorialized on
October 31, 2000, that the state should reexamine its method of
selecting judges through contested elections. "Until there is change in
the system, challengers in [s]upreme
[c]ourt contests will continue to
7
press the political envelope."

V. FEDERALISM, AN ENDURING HERITAGE
That open space that fills your vision and lifts your heart when you
drive across the West is federal open space, most of it. Federally
owned, protected, managed, federally kept open to almost any sort of
reasonable public use. If it brings some irritations from hordes of
tourists, it also fills the local treasury, and it gives a large part of the
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1271.
Rocky Barker, Water Ruling Reversed, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 28, 2000, at A 01.
Id.
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N.S. Nokkentved, justices Reverse Water Ruling, TIMEs-NEws, Oct. 28, 2000, at Al.
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spaciousness and satisfaction to western living. As for wilderness
areas, if we had had to depend on the states for their protection,
there would pretty clearly be none ... If the West is going to be saved

in anything like its present state, it will not be by the states or the
oligarchs who dominate most western capitals.
It will be
accomplished, if at all, by the greatest cooperation possible between
state and federal, private and federal, private and state, business and
agriculture.
Wallace Stegner"'

The Idaho election result reverberated across the United States.
The Georgetown University Law Center's Environmental Policy Project
urged environmental interests nationwide to take an active role in
future state judicial elections." 9 In light of national news reports,
those interested in preserving judicial independence and resisting
political influences on judges questioned whether the Idaho Supreme
Court, particularly its chief justice, had found itself in a political
firestorm, the intensity of which it had not foreseen and did not
withstand.
The impact of the Idaho experience on western state McCarran
adjudications remains to be seen. Additionally, the states differ in
their methods for selecting state judges and their political climates.
While fed-supplicating and fed-denigrating may be a stock-in-trade of
water politics-raising the fervor and the fever of water lawyers-a
state judge takes an oath of office to uphold the Constitution and the
laws of the United States and the state. In instances of preemptive
conflict, federal law prevails. In addition,judicial ethics require judges
to reach reasoned decisions and not alter the conclusions they reach
based on political considerations.
Evidence that state water politics is poisoning the well of fair
hearings has its remedy in the exercise of federal court concurrent
jurisdiction over the claims of the federal agencies and the tribes. The
split of the Idaho Supreme Court on the issue of wilderness water
rights dramatizes the toll federalism can take on state judges, as they
grapple with strongly advocated, inherently adversarial positions with
political content and implications.
Scholarship, deference to legislative intent, and straightforward
exposition of the court's reasoning-this is the judicial ideal. The
judicial ideal should be the expected norm.
Justice Silak's opinion in favor of wilderness water rights, like
118. WALLACE STEGNER, Land: America's History Teacher, in MARKING THE SPARROW'S
FALL: WALLACE STEGNER'SAMERICAN WEST 274, 276 (Page Stegner ed., 1998).
119. ENVIRONMENTAL POuCY PROJECT, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER,
CHANGING THE RULES BY CHANGING THE PLAYERS: THE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE IN STATE

JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 48 (2000).
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Judge Kane's before it in Colorado, was based on the forceful
declarations Congress made in legislation favoring wilderness
preservation. Her opinion was principled, not outlandish. It relied on
the words of the statutes, the evident intent of Congress, leaving to
legislators the evident policy issues.
The dissent to Justice Silak's opinion was also principled. It
pointed out that neither the 1964 Wilderness Act, nor the individual
Idaho wilderness designations created an express reserved water
right.2 The language of no claim/no denial of exemption from state
water law was patently the product of compromise designed to sidestep
the issue. However, because the intent of Congress is determinative
and Congress raised the very issue and then declined to resolve it, any
court could logically conclude that Congress was not concerned with
the creation of reserved water rights for wilderness areas, leaving the
New Mexico doctrine applicable, as opposed to the Winters doctrine.
The Idaho Supreme Court majority and dissenting opinionsboth sets of them-are well joined. The strength of the court's
combined exposition, together with the evident need for final
resolution, would seem to have made the Idaho case a logical
candidate for United States Supreme Court review, but the
government did not pursue a petition for certiorari. Congress and/or
the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the polar opposites of wilderness
water rights advocacy, the not-one-drop-shall-you-take from a
wilderness area position versus the thou-shalt-not-tred-on-me state
water law position.
The dilemma the Idaho Supreme Court faced is a study for other
state supreme courts. Justice Silak's reelection bid, like Justice Stone's
before it, became a political crucible, overshadowing the role of courts
in the separation of powers and the merits of those serving in judicial
office. Unlike Justice Stone's instance, where the Colorado Supreme
Court refused to grant rehearing, the Idaho Supreme Court granted
rehearing and reversed the outcome when the chief justice, who had
concurred with Justice Silak's opinion, agreed with the two dissenters
to deny the wilderness water claims. The rehearing process extended
through Justice Silak's defeat.
While a judge should vote for rehearing if he or she may have
misapprehended the facts or the law of the case, a rehearing and the
substitution of an opposite opinion, is rare, in contrast with modifying
the decision to make corrections while maintaining the same outcome
and denying the rehearing petition. The essence of appellate
deliberation is to test the strength of the proposed opinion,
intellectually and practically. The appellate process is deliberate
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enough to allow thorough study and consideration before the court's
final vote and release of a majority opinion. Non-authoring justices
have a choice between two proposed opinions-to choose one or the
other, or to author yet a third opinion, for the purpose of gaining a
clearer majority or sharpening the court's analysis.
Significant questions deserve doubled efforts at consensus
building among the justices whenever possible. Because justices must
work in isolation, rather than the consultation in which the officials of
the legislative and executive branches are free to engage in, they
always owe to each other the courtesy of well-expressed critique,
thoughtful insight, and prudent foresight.
The Idaho Supreme Court's switched outcome is likely to be the
source of continued speculation. Did the court engage in politics in
reaching its first decision, in granting the rehearing, in reversing itself
on rehearing amidst a public outcry? Or did the majority justices
simply get it wrong, with the authoring justice bearing the ultimate
responsibility?
Lost in the Idaho controversy is the fact that the Idaho Supreme
Court, despite denying the wilderness water rights claims on
rehearing, nevertheless determined that congressional legislation
designating certain Idaho national recreation areas and wild and
scenic rivers carried with them expressly reserved water rights, the
amount thereof to be quantified on remand."' Idaho water users also
strongly contested the existence of these rights, and the Idaho
Supreme Court decisions in this regard. Others like it, arising from
the McCarran proceedings, are candidates for United States Supreme
Court review as well.
Thus, despite the surrounding political rhetoric of state primacy
and sovereignty in water matters, it is clear that the Idaho Supreme
Court did not take Justice Silak's defeat as a reason to retreat to an
unmitigated application of state water law, in the face of the
Constitution and laws of the United States. And in rulings by the
Arizona Supreme Court in adjudication of tribal water rights,'22
McCarran decisions in Idaho's Snake River Basin Adjudication bode
well for the ability of western state courts to go about the judicial
business of resolving state and federal water claims.
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The role of settlement in these complex adjudications is also
important. Subordination of federal claims to present and reasonable
future needs of the state is a possibility, in return for recognition of
enforceable rights for protection of environmental values. Those
committed to absolutist positions on both sides of the equation always
have difficulty with such proposals, but significant differences can
make for significant settlement achievements, accommodating
important interests.
Surely, Congress has delivered severely
contrasting mixed messages through its traditional deference to state
law and its strong environmental protection statutes.
Water users of all stripes, including those favoring environmental
uses, are bound-in the system of water use property rights that
Congress and the states have fostered-to the fundamental precept
that juniors must stand aside while seniors exercise their rights, when
there is not enough to supply all uses. Ignoring this in favor of
passionate commitment to one's own point of view and interest
mistakenly ignores the operative principle that water remains a public
resource committed to disposition and use in priority.
Undoubtedly, the Idaho Water Bar will look both to the
boundaries of its advocacy role and to its role in fostering a
continuously independent and fair judiciary. So will the water bars of
the other western states, in light of the Colorado and Idaho
experiences. Fair judges conducting fair hearings must be the norm.
Judicial political decision-making has no place in the separation of
powers; that would undermine public confidence even more surely
than a handful of controversial decisions.
The media also plays a very important role. Through reporting
and editorializing, it can stand watch on the maturation and well being
of each state's community. Operating in the community requires
good scholarship, common sense, an eye to history, attention to detail,
and well considered premonitions of future possibilities. If judges
must run against opponents for election and raise funds, can they
really focus on the merits of the cases before them? In light of the
recent experience, the Idaho press began to engage in reflective
deliberation on the important issues of government, natural resource
use and preservation, and the federal relationships involved. Such
public inquiry has a way of spilling into public policy.
The two chambers of the western heart, the two lobes of the
western mind, are beneficial use and preservation.
Growth and
glorious natural habitat, this is the heritage of the public domain. Our
rapidly urbanizing western experience-bridled by our love for the
vistas, rivers, and all life, our natural optimism, our need for each
other-in this our western place, so prized by the entire country, shall
carry us forward.

